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396.) As said in ,Ernst v. Searle,.218 qal.;supra, at page"237;
"its essential elements are representatiQn by the principal,
justifiable reliance thereQn by the third party, and change' of
PQsitiQn Qr injury resulting frQm such reliance." (See', ahlQ,
Rest., Agency, § 265.)
[35] The evidence dQes nQt permit a finding that these
elem~nts are present here. The recQrd is devQid Qf anyshQwing that plaintiff at the time Qf the transactiQn thQught Qr
believed that Greene was acting fQr the corpQratiQn, Qr that
he relied on any such belief. His attQrney, Harris, wrote to'
CrQcker's attQrney that plaintiff's stQck was to' be transferred
to' the nQminee Qf the representatives Qf the estate and that
they WQuld make payment therefQr. [36] Unless it can be
said that Greene was acting Qr purPQrting to' act fQr the co.rPQratiQn, liability shQuld nQtbe predicated solely Qn the fact
that he was the Qnly perSQn whO' PQssessed knQwledge Qf the
value of the stQck. AlthQugh the fact that Greene had special
knowledge Qf the affairs Qf the cQrpQratiQn entitled plaintiff
to' rely Qn Greene's representatiQns cQncerning thQse facts, it
WQuld nQt justify plaintiff in believing. that Greene was acting
sm behalf of the cQrpQratiQn when Greene did nQt purport
to' act in that capacity and plaintiff understQQd that he was
acting as a representative Qf the estate and fQr the purchaser
Qf the stQck.
'
,
The case Qf Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Ca1.2d 479 [80
P,2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383], is clearly distinguishable in that
there the bank manager whO' was guilty Qf the fraudulent rep.
resentatiQns purpQrted to' be acting for the bank, plaintiff be",
lievedhe was SO' acting and was authQrized to' dO' SO', and, in
additiQn, it was custQmary fQr the manager to' make statements
to' customers upon matters such asthQse embraced by the rep~
resentatiQns.
.
The judgments are reversed.
",t

Shenk, J., Oarter, J., TraynQr, J., and Schauer, J." cQncurred;
SPENCE, J.-I CQncur in
UPQn .the grQunds stated but
said in the majQrity QpiniQn.
shQuld be reversed UPQn the
,evi~~nce, ,~s a matter Qf law,

the reversal Qf the judgments
cannQt subscribe to' all that is
In my QpiniQn, the judgments
further grQunds: (I) thakthe
was insufficienUp establish~aO-
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ti~~able fraud and (2) that plaintiff's alleged cause Qf ac-

ti~n, as a matter Qf law, was barred by the statute Qf limitatiQns. I am Qf the view that the facts and the law relating
to' these further grQunds fQr reversal were exhaustively and
correctly discussed in the dissenting QpiniQn written by Mr.
JiI~tice Knight at the time this case was pending in the
District CQurt of Appeal, to which, dissenting opiniQn reference is hereby made. (Hobart v. Hobart Estate 00. (Cal.
App.~, 148 P.2d 41, 59.)
.

. Edmonds, J., cQncurred.

[So F. No. 16970. In Bank. May 31, 1945.J
Estate of FRANK D. MADISON, Deceased. HARRY B.
RILEY, as State CQntroller, etc., Appellant, v. MARSHALL P. MADISON, as Executor,etc., et al.,
Respondents.
,[1] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Questions of Law and Fact.
-While it may be a question of fact whether a given transfer
was intended to take. effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the transferor's death within the Inheritance Tax Act
~r' of 1935 {Stats. 1935,- ch. 358, § 2(3).(b); Deering's Gen~ Laws,1,935 Bupp., Act 8495), when his intention is not set forth in
a written instrument or there is an attempt to tax an otherwise
nontaxable transfer by proof ofa parol agreement incon~
sistent with the instrument'of transfer, a different situation
is presented whe;re a deceased trustor's intention is clearly
,;," 'set forth in the trust instruments and where the issue is simply whether the transfer intended and made is one covered by.
the statute, as this involves a question of law.
'I2] Statutes ~ Construction - Question as One o.f Law or Fact.~
. T4e(lonstruction of a statute and its applicability to a given
situation are matters of law to be determined by the court.
[Sa, Sb] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Transfers Inter Vivos'"' ' Transfers Taking Effect at Death.-Where a deceased .trustor
,',

. ,_ [2] ,S~e 10Cal.Jur. 882; 23 Cal.Jur. 719.
..
.
[3] See 24 Cal.Jur. 452; 28 Am.Jur. 88.
McR:. Dig. References: II] Taxation,' § 454; [2] Statutes,-§ 111;
[3] Taxation, § 432; [4, 5] Statut~s, § 180(2); [6JTaxation, § 430;
[7J T~usts, § 186 i [8J Trusts, § 87.

/
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created separate and irrevocable trusts in favor of his. chil~
dren,which were to terminate and the property was to he
delivered to them at his death, and which provided that during
his lifetime portions of the trust property could be paid to
beneficiary with the' trustee's consent, and where two of'the
childreri so obtained portions of the trust property, the b,al;..
ance remaining in the trllsts at the. time of the trustor's death.
was' subject to an inheritance tax, as he intended that the
transfer of said balance should then take effect· in possessioIl;
or enjoyment. It is immaterial that his dispositions might
have· been defeated, before his death .under certain contingencies which did not occur.
[4] Statutes-Construction-Executive Qr DepartmElntal Construc~
tinn.-The mere fact that the controller in a previous year
failed to tax trusts subject to .an inheritance tax does not
pr~clude a subsequent taxation of similar trusts, since. mere
faIlure to act does not constitute an admiriistrative construc-

a: .

ti0n.

r5] Id.~Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction:
-An erroneous administrative construction does not govern
the interpretation of a statute, even though the statute is sub-.
sequently reenacted without change.'
.
[6] Taxation - Inheritance Taxation - Transfers w.ter Vivos.The purpose of the. Legislature in imposing a tax on transfers
intended to take effect at 'or after death is to prevent avoid~
ance of the inheritance tax.
.
[7] Trusts-Spendthrift Trusts.-Where irrevocable trusts which
are to terminate on the trustor's death contain spendthrift
provisions, the beneficiaries cali neither dispose of their interest in the corpus nor request that the trusts be terminated
before such death.
'
[8] Id.-Duration~Terniination.-Trusts which are to'continue'
for the .life of the trustor cimnot be terminated priQr to his
death SInce other persons, some· perhaps not yet born have
possible interests in the trust property.
.
"

APPEAL from a judgment of . the Superior Court of
Marin County fiXing inheritance tax. Edward I. Butler,
J udg-e. Reversed.
Raymond G. La Noue; Inheritance Tax Attorney, Arthur
. W.Brouillet, Deputy Inheritance Tax Attorney, Richard O.
[4] See 23 CaLJu,r. 776; 50 Am.Jur. 309.

O'Connor, Assistant DE)puty Inheritance Tax Attorney, for
Appellant.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 19, 1935, the decedent created
three trusts, one each for his two' daughters and one for his
son. The corpus of each trust consisted of stocks and bonds
valued at approximately $100,000. The provisions of the
trusts material to this case were identiMl.
(iE'ach trust for to continue for the life. of the trustor, during which time the income from the son's trust was. to be
accumulated, while the income from the daughters' trusts was
to be paid to them".Each trustee was authorized, if he deemed
it in the b~st interest of the beneficiary, to deliver to him
uP9n request portions of' the corpus not to exceed an aggregate' or $50,000 plus 50 per cent of any property that the
b-Jllitor might add to the trust. Under this provision, one
daughter received 20 per cent and the other 30 per cent of
the corpus of her trust before their father's death.
Upon the termination of each trust upon the trustor's death,
the carpus (together with the accumulated income in the ease
of the'son's trust) was then "t6 go to and vest in" the respective beneficiaries. If a beneficiary did not survive the
trustQr. the property, both income and principal, was to go as
the beneficiary might appoint by will; in default of such
appointment it was to go to his or her children and their heirs.
.Each .ti'Ustee .was given complete authority to manage and
control the respective trust estates. None of the'trusts could
he revoked Or amended, and the trustor made no reservations
. in his favor, altl:l.Ough he expressed· the wish that his consent
l)e' obtained' before the trustee sold or otherwise disposed of
,the .trlist property~ The iriterests of all beneficiaries were
protected by spendthrift provisions and thus could not be
assigned or subjected to the claims of creditors. The decedent's son was named trustee of his sisters' trusts. The deceident.himself became trustee of his son's trust .. In 1938, however,a law partner of both the decedent and his son was appointed trustee of the latter trust;
.At the time of the execution of the trusts, decedent wrote a
letter to his son, stating that the transfers were made, not in
'contemplation of death, but to avoid hlgh income taxes,to make
,his "daughters independent of the monthly allowances that he

456

,Esi'A'J:E

OF MADISQN

[26'C~2d

h.a~

P!eviously.been giving them, and to place his'son in a po':;
sItlOn substantlally equal to theirs. The trustor was then ,68
years old, healthy, active and vigorous. He died six years
later from CI;tUSes unforeseen at the' time the trusts\vere
executed.
. The controller seeks to collect an inheritance tax upon the
transfers on the grounds that they were intended to take effect
in possessio~ or enjoyment at the donor's death and that they
were made In contemplation of the donor's death. (Inheritance Tax Act of 1935, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1935 Supp., Act
8495, § 2 (3) (b) and § 2 (3) (a); Stats. 1935, ch.358, §2(3)
(b) and § 2 (3) (a).) There was no conflict in the evidence
on either is!;Iue.The trial court entered judgment in favor of
respondents and the controller appeals.
'
Section 2(3) (b) of the Inheritance T~x Act ,of 1935, imposes a tax upon the "transfer of any property . . . in trust
or otherwise ... (3) When the transfer is of property made
by a resident or by a 'nonresident ..'. (b) Intended to take
.effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death, or in
~hich a'life income or interest is reserved by the grantor,
eIther. expressly or impliedly, or by the grantee promising' to
make payments to or care for the grantor." . [1] Respondentseontend. tljat whether a given transfer was intended to
take effect ill possession. or enjoyment at or after .death is a
.question of tact; on which a decision of the trial court supported by substantia,! evidence is conclusive. This contention
maybe valid when the transferor's intention is not set forth
in a written instrument but must be determined from the surrounding, circumstances, or when there' is an atteni.pt to tax
an otherwise nontaxable transfer by proof of a parol agree"
ment inconsistent with the terms of the instrument of trans"
fer. (KeU,!/ v. Woolse.y.,l77 Cal. 325 [170 P:831]; Spreckels
.v. State; 30 Cal.App.363 [158 P. 549]; McDougald. v. Wulzen', '
.34 Cal.App. 21 [166,P. 1033]; Estateof Schmidt, 49Cal.App.
2d 86 [121 P.2d 104].) In this case, however, decedent's
tention was clearly set forth in the trust instrq,ments. No at~
tempt was made to show that he had any othf;l:t' intention. No
question as to the ~onstruction of the trust instrument is presented. The issue is simply whether the transfer Intended and
,made is a transfer covered by the statute. [2] The con;structiorr of a statute and its applicability to. a given situation
,a~e1X!-atters of law to be" determined by the court. (CountYJ)!
t§~e~r.a.,v. County of Nevada, 155 Cal. 1114 {99P. 371h~ig.1t~l

m-
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Hill v; County of Los Angeles, 196 CaL 16.1, 168 [236 P. 3041;
Bodinson'Mfg. Co. v.Calif01·nia Employment Com., 17 Ca1.2d
321, 326 [109 P.2d 935] ; Estate oJ Platt, 21 Cal.2d 3~3, 352
{131P.2d 825]; Mitchel v. Brown, 43 CaJ.App.2d 217, 222
[110 P.2d 456]; see 23Cal.Jur. 719; 10 Cal.Jur. 882.)
[Sa] Respondents contend that regardless of the provi,sions in the gift instrument, an inter vivos gift is never taxable under section 2 (3) (b) unless title, possession, or enjoyment are retained by the donor until his death. The precise
-question has never been passed' upon in this state. Respondents call to our attention the case of Estate of Scnmidt, supra,
'which they deem conclusive. In that case a gift of shares from.
. a husband to his wife was held not taxable on the ground that
it had been made "without any reservation· and without any
intention that it should take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the deceased;" (49 CaLApp.2d £6,
89.} The ground upon which the controller relies here was not
available to him in Estate of Schmidt, for there were no trust
or other . restrictions on the possession and enjoyment of the
property in that case.
The transfer that the controller seeks to tax is that which
occurred in 1935 when the trusts were ,created. (I1unt v.
Wicht, 174 Cal. 205 [162P. 639, L.R.A. 1917 C 961]; Estate
of Potter, 188' Cal. 55 [204 P. 826].) The issue is not whether
the donor retained some power Qr interest until his death, but
rather whether he tied up the property with so many strings,
which could not be loosened until his death,. that the t'ransf~r
may be regarded as having been intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at his death within. the meaning of the
statute. It should be noted at the outset that the statute
speaks, not of title, but of possession and enjoyment. Were
it not tor worthy authority to the contra!y, a gift of inconie
for the trustor's life with remainder at the" trustor's death
would appear from the plain wording of the statute to be a
transfer intended to. take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death. In the early case of In re Cruger (54 App.Div.
405 [66 N.Y.S. 636], aff'd 166 N;Y. 602 [59 N.E. 1121}), in
which the facts as to part of the property transferred were
similar to those of the present case, th,e court said: "If there
',were
authority, we should think that the plain reading of
the statute brought this ease within its terms." (54 App.Div.
,405 [66 N~Y.s. 636, 638].) More recently, in Hartford v.

no
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Martin, 122 N.J.L. 283 [4 A.2d 31, 121 A.L.K 354). the court
said: "There would seem to be no. reason in principle why the
settlor'!,! reservation of an interest in the trust res should be
the test of .taxability. The question is, after all, one of statutory construction, and the statute, in language that does not
reasonably admit of doubt as to the legislative intention, renders taxable all ~ransfers '. . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death'." (122 N.J.L.
283, 286 [4 A.2d 31, 121 A.L.R. 354].)
Yet the courts are sharply divided on the question of the
taxability of trusts such as these under statutes similar to
,ours. The leading case against taxability is Reinecke v. North·
ern Trust Co. (278 U.S. 339 [49 S.Ct. 123,73 L.Ed. 410]) ,
construing section 402 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1921, (42 Stat.
278, now §811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S,C.A.
§ 8U(c)), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that trusts like those here involved were not intended to take
-effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. The court
pointed out that in its plan and scope the tax was one im·
posed on transfers made atdeath or in contemplation of death
.'and that the only section imposing the tax, section 401 (42
Stat. 277) ,did so on the net estate of Ii decedent. The court
. then continued: "In the light of the general purpose of the
. statute and the language of section 401 explicitly imposing
the tax on net estates of decedents, we think it at least doubtful whether the trusts or interests in a trust intended to be
reached by the phrase in section 402 (c) 'to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,' include any others
than those passing from the possession, enjoyment or control
of the donor.at his death and so taxable as transfers at death
_under section 401." (278 U.S. 339, 348 [49 8.Ct. 123, 73 L.Ed.
410].) That doubt the court resolved in favor of the taxpayer;
The Reinecke case arose under an estate tax statute, whereas
.our statute imposes an inheritance tax. There are distinctions between the federal estate tax system and the inheritance
tax system prevailing in most states-distinctions to which this
court had occasion to refer in Estate of Miller (184 Cal. 674
[195 P. 413, 16 A.L.K 694]) as follows: "The California tax
" isa succession tax, a tax on the beneficial interest of each
beneficiary or heir.' .. . . The federal tax . • . on the other
, hand, is not a succession tax, but an estate tax, not a tax on
~:what comes to the beneficiaries Or, heirs" but upon what is left
by the decedent." (184 Cal. 674, 678.)
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Se;tion 401 of ~~e federal act imposes.the tax upon the dece'dent s net estate to the extent of the mterest therein of the
decedent a~ the. time of his .death." (§ 402 (a) ,42 Stat. 278.)
In ~he Cahfo~Ia act there IS no provision making the reservatIOn of an mterest by the donor the test of taxabIlity.
Moreover, while. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., ,supra, has
not been overruled, the authority of that case has been considerably diminished by subsequent decisions of' the. United
States Supreme Court.
..
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra, was decided in 1929.
Less ~han two yea:s later the United States Supreme Court
held mMay v . .He~ner (281 U.S. 283 [50 S.Ct. 286,74 L.Eq.
826, u7 A.L.K '1244] ), that a gift with a reservation of a life
~state to the donor was not a transfer intended to take effect
m possession or enjoyment at or after death. In retrospect 'it
does not seem surprising that a court that was about to interpret section 402 (c), supra, so strikingly in terms of a shift in
titl~ rather than a shift in possession or enjoyment should have
deCIded the Reinecke case as it did. To a state court however
that long before the decision in May v. Heiner, supr~, had up~
held the taxability of gifts reserving a life estate to the donor
(see Estate of Felton, 176 Cal. 663 [169 P. 392]; Estate of
Mu.rphy, 182 Cal: 740 [190 P. 46] ; Estate of Potter, supra, tl~e
Remecke case mIght not appear authoritative. In Helt'ering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 AL:K
1368]) the 1!ni~ed States Supreme Court itself made a I:rignificant change m Its approach to problems involving transfers intended to take effect at or after death. In that case the-donorretained no life estate, but the property was to revert to him if
he survived the life tenant. If he did not the remainder went
to his children. The- donor died first and the court sustained
the inclusion of the corpus in his gross estate for estate tax
purposes. In May v.. Heiner, supra, the lapse at the donor's
death of his interest in the property, a life estate, was not' _
?nough to support the tax, for according to the. court, no
Interest then passed from the dead to the living. It is dif~
ficuJt to believe that the court found in the lapse of the donor's
possibility ofl'everter in Helvering v. Hallock, supra, an interestP.assing from the dead,to the living sufficient to satisfy the
reqUIrements of May v. Heiner, supra. It is more likely that the
court had ceased to "subordinate the plain purposes of:a mod"
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ern fiscal measure" (Helve ring v. Hallock, supra, at p. 112)
to technical considerations of property law. In fact the court
said as much in H elve1'ing v. Hallock in refusing to distin~
guish, for estate tax purposes, the various casuistries .of the
law of remainders.
The extent to which the Supreme Court has departed from
its early interpretation of the federal act is shown even
more clearly in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust 00. v. Rothensies
( - - U.S. - - [65 S.Ot. 508, 89 L.Ed. --]) construing t1(1
corresponding sections of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat.
70). There the trustor retained a life estate, after which the
property was to go to her two daughters for life with a remain"
der to their surviving issue. If no issue survivedche daughters, the corpus was to go as the trustor might appoint by
will; in default of such appointment named charities were the
ultimate beneficiaries. Taxability was conceded, but the estate
sought to avoid paying a tax on the entire value of the property at the time of the trustor's death. Since the trustor had
retained a life estate, all that was needed to sustain a tax on
the entire value was to overrule May v. Heiner, supra. The
court, however, rested its decision on the ground that the
trustor retained a string, which, upon certain contingencies,
would have permitted her to direct by will the further disposition of the corpus. The retention of such a string, the cOUrt
said, "might have resulted in altering completely the plan
contemplated by the trust instrument for the transmission of
decedent's property.... " (65 S.Ct. 508, 510.) Consequently
. the value of the entire corpus. was subject to the tax. The retention of that string, however, could have no effect on the
daughters' life estates .. It gave the trustor control over the
disposition of the property only after the daughters' interests
had terminated, or after the death of both daughters in the
trustor's lifetime precluded their life estates from coming into
existence. The daughters' interests were contingent upon their
surviving their mother; but that contingency was created by
the mother's retaining a life estate, not by her retaining ,a
reversionary interest. (See Nelson,. The Stinson Case, 23 Tax
Magazine 245.) A quotation from Oommissioner v. Estate of
Field, - - U.S. - - [65 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. --], a companion case, shows even more clearly the court's present approach: "The estate tax isnot based on. the value of the reversionary interest of the decedent at the time of his death,
but on the value • • • of the property to which that • • •
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interest relates. It makes no difference.
how remote or
uncertain may be the decedent's reversionary interest. If the
corpus does not shed the possibility of reversion until at or
after the decedent's death, the value of the entire corpus on
the date of death is taxable." (65 S.Ct. 5:i1, 512.) Although
the decedent in Fidelity-Ph~7adelphia Trust 00. v. Rothensies,
supra, retained a reversionary interest until his death, the tax
was not measured by the extent of his interest at the time of
his death. The value of the entire corpus was taxed, not
merely the value of the reversionary interest. If a reversionary interest has no more than a nominal value, a tax measured by the entire corpus is necessarily imposed on the transfer of an interest that the decedent had not retained but had
allowed to pass to the living before his death. The fact that
the value of the entire corpus of a trust is now subject to the
federal tax, even though the interest retained by the trustor
is unsubstantial, suggests that the retention of an interest by
the donor has become less significant as a test of taxability
than the restrictions imposed by him on the possession or enjoyment of the property until his death. (See 1 Paul, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation, 297; Inter Vivos Transfers and The
Federal Estate Tax, 49 Yale L.J. 1118, 1123.)
Respondents rely on cases from several states in addition to
Reinecke v. Northern Trust 00., supra .. In re Prange's Will,
201 Wis. 636 ['231 N.W. 271], was decided exclusively on the
authority of the Reinecke case. Nor is there any compelling
· argument in favor of plaintiffs' position in People v. Welch's
JjJstate, 235 Mich. 555 [209 N.W. 930].) Safe Deposit Etc. 00 .
v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351 [29 A.2d 906], is not in point, for the
transfer there in question took place before the enactment of
the statute. Cases from New York are cited by the controller
· as well as by respondents. The law in that state appears unsettled. (Compare In re Oruger, supra; In re Patterson's Estate, 127 N.Y.S. 284, aff'd 204 N.Y.' 677 [98 N.E., 1109] i In
· reDunlap's Estate, 205 App.Div. 128 [199 N.Y.S. 147]; with
In re Schweinert's Estate, 133 Misc. 762 [234 N.Y.S. 307];
In re Kirby's Estate, 228 App.Div. 171 [239 N.Y.S. 390],
aff'd 254 N.Y. 624 [173 N.E. 894].) In Inre Dolan's Estate,
279 Pa. 582 [124 A. 176, 49 A.L.R. 858], the court refused to
sustain the tax even though the donor reserved a power of
revocation. That case is therefore not pertinent here, although
it no doubt indicates that a jurisdiction that does not ~llow
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taxation when a power of revocation is reserved would a fortiori reject it when no reservation whatever is made by th~
grantor. .In Illinois, the rule against taxability seems to. have
originated in an unsupported dictum in People v. McCormick,
327 IlL 547 [158 N.E. 861], a case in which the transfer was
held taxable. Moreover, it should be noted that Illinois is
linother minority jurisdiction in: which gifts with the reservation. of a power of revocation are held not taxable (People
v. Northern Trust Co., 289 IlL 475 [124 N.E. 662, 7 A.L.R.
709] ; see Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect in
Possession at Grantor's Death, 26 Iowa hRev. 514, 529).
Respondents cOntend that the cases upon which the controller relies all come from jurisdictions with rules of property
law opposed to the rules adopted in, California. Whether that
be true or not is immaterial, for the reasoning in these cases
is based on realistic considerations regarding the possession
and enjoyment of the property that are as relevant here as
in those jurisdictions. Moreover, the case upon which respondents rely as establishing the California rule of property la,w
does. not preclude taxation in the. present case. Hunt v. Wicht,
supra, holds merely that the statute does not apply retroactively. Nor is respondents' position improved by considering
the .trustee as agent of the beneficiary. The trustee no doubt
acquired possession before the trustor's death, but his enjoyment was as limited as that of the beneficiary.
With the trustee's consent, each beneficiary could have
obtained, and decedent's daughters did obtain, portions of the
trust property. The controller does not seek to tax the portions thus advanced, but only the balane() remaining in the
trusts at the time of the father's death. n is true that, since
the value of each trust might have fallen in the trustor's lifetime below the limit of $50,000 set upon withdrawals, the
trusts might conceivably have terminated before his death.
This provision shows no more than that the trustor had alternative intentions. He made dispositions intended to take effect
at his death, yet indicated his willingness that they be defeated under certain contingencies. It is irrelevant that his
dispositions were subject to certain contingencies now that
those contingencies can no longer occur. In fact, the trusts
lasted tintil the trustor's death, and the trustor certainly
intended that the transfer of what remained of the corpUs
should take effect in possession or enjoyment at his death.
Not.a:x: is imposed upon the transfer of the portions released in
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his lifetime. But to the extent that the transfers took effect at
death ashe intended, the tax should be upheld. "In a possible'contingency . . . enjoyment . . . might have begun
while the grantor was yet in being. We think this feature is
insufficient to take the case out of the rule. . . . We are to
view the sequence of events in the order of the actual rather
than the possible." (Matter ofSchmidlapp, 236 N.Y. 278,
285-286 [140 N.E. 697].)
' .
[4] Respondents finally contend that the control!er's admitted failure in 1923 to tax similar trusts, the trusts. Involved
in Wheeler v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 695, amounted to an
administrative construction of the statute, and that' this construction was adopted by the Legislature in 1939 when itreenacted the statute, and now precludes taxation in this, case.
Mere failure to act, however, does not constitute an administrative construction. (Louisville v. Board of Education, 154
Ky. 316 [157 S.W. 379], and cases cited in 2. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p. 520, n. 9.) [5] Moreover an erroneous administrative construction does not gov~rn the int~rpretationof a statute, even though' the statute
is SUbsequently reenacted without change. (Whitcomb Hotel,
lnc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 753,757-758 [151 P.2d
233], and cases therein cited.)
[6] The purpose of the Legislature in imposing a tax. on
transfers intended to take effect at or after death is to prevent
aVOIdance of the inheritance tax. "The sole reason for mentioning dispositions inter vivos . . . is to prevent the. evasion
of the tax ... by such dispositions. In contemplation of tha.t
'law [the inheritance tax law], the gifts inter vivos therein
mentioned are all presumed to have been made with the intent
to evade the tax imposed on transfers taking effect by succession at death." (Estate of Potter, supra, 63.) Section
2(3) (b) does not impose a tax upon certain precisely de"
fined transfers; it is rather an attempt to impose a tax in all
cases regardless of the form' of transfer adopted, in which
posll~ssion or enjoyment does not take effect unW the donor's
death.
[3b] .Even though a trustor may have parted with al~ interest in the prope.rty, limitations that he has imposed will last
as long as the trust lasts. Decedent's children were allover
21 years of age at the time the trusts were created. The daugh~
ters were married. It is unlikely, therefore; that. decedent·
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entertained any doubts as to~he ability of the beneficiaries:
to manage the property. If it~had been because of such doubtS
that he chose to make the gifts in trust rather than outright,
he hardly would have provided that the trusts should:terininate ripOlihis death. Moreover; since'the trusts are not in the
nature ofaiamily settlement, with the usual provisions for life
estates tachildren and remainders to grandchildren, the conclusionish;'escapable that decedent advisedly chose to make
gifts. in trust so that, for the rest of his lifetime, the principal
would be kept intact.l;tnd the income would be paid to the
fumjlyof which" he was the head.!'The case presents a typical.one of a,donQr possessed of large property intere!'1tsdenuding.himself othispossession~ and placing them in the friendly
hands of his 'immediate family, taking care to see that they do
not get away· from' his own superior control as head of the
family during his lifetime.... It is said that no income Was
reserved to the grantor. In literal terms this is true . . . but
in,substance it was otherwise. The highest instincts of the famiiyare to guard and protect, and, if necessary, provide for its
members.' The close relation of its members could leave no
doubt that the donor was placing the property in the hands
of those to whom he could look with every assurance that any
or all of the income would be his for the asking. It was as
to the income potentially within the donor's reach and as to
the entire principal transfer intended to take effect at his
death." (Koch v; McCutcheon, 111 N.J.L. 154,156-157 [167
A.752].) To the same effect are In re HoUander's Estate, 123
N.J.Eq. 52 [195 A. 805]; Hartford v. Mar~in, supra; State
Street Prust' Co. v. Treasurer, 209 Mass. 373 [95 N.E. 8511;
and Coolidge v. Commissioner, 268 Mass. 443 [167 N.E. 75'7].
The United States Supreme Court reversed the latter case, but
Qngrounds that had nothing to do with the construction of the
statute. (Coolidge v. Long, 2.82 U.S. 582 [51 S.Ot. 306, 75
L.Ed. 562].) Of all the cases that support the controller's
position, perhaps none contains so clear an. analysis of the
problem involved as a recent Connecticut case; Bridgeport
City Trust Co.' v. MCLaughlin: " . . . The necessary intent
existed that some change in the son's rights in the trust property should take effect on his (the trustor's) death, .. , The
next question' is, was this change a transfer of possession or
enjoyment ..•• taxable under the statute~ ... The death of
the settlor broke the shackles of the trust~e's, managem,ent of
thetl-ust and gave the son the right to use the principal as his
own .property~ •• • To most persons the transfer of the un-
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biidieq t:ight. to h;'mdl~ mo.neywliich they have previously
been. unable to ihvest'or spend at
except as the net income
is" doled out eto them by a trustee, would .constitute a transfer>
of aconsidetable· amount of· enjoyment in·. the, money. . . . "
(p,rentiC6·;q:all Inheritanceand Transfer ']'ax Service, voL 2,
p.. 1025 of Conneciicutsection.) Although the Supreme Court
of Er,rors of Connecticut has had n06pportunity to pass upon
that case;its.position on the question .is c~early ~tilted in
BrYlkn{v. Hackett, 118 Conn, 233,. 2~4:[171 A. 664]: "This
Pllrposea,nd policy"might be as completely defeated by a transferal property in such a way that the owner has parted with.
all control and dominion over tt:as by one where he reserveS'
s~ch control. Such a reservation might perhaps make taxable
a,transfer which otherwise would not be, but the lack of it does
n~tpr~~ent the taxation of transfers falling WIthin the terms
of the. statute."
.
It 'sh~uld be noted thlJ,t ,the" "shackles" of ~hetrusts were
stronger in the present case than 'in some of the cases just
cited. The respondents' interests were conti-ngent uPon their
~Urviving the trustor. [7]. Each trust contained spendthrift provisions so that the beneficiaries .could neitp.er dis~
pose oitheir interest in the corpus (Seymour v. MoAvoy, 121
Cal. 438, 442 [53 P. 946,41 hR.A, 544]; McColgan v, Magee;
Inc;, 17~ CaL 182, 186 [155 P. 995"Ann.Cas. 1917 D 1050];
Estate of Edwards, 217 Cal. 25,27 [17P.2d 116]; Kelly v:
/felly,l1CaL2d 356,362 [79 P.2d 1059, 11 kL.R. 71], see 2.3
Cal. JUl'. 519) nor request that the trust..'" .be terminated before
tp:e trustor's death. (Fletcher v. Los AnfJeles Tr.. &Sav. Bank,
182Cal~ 177, 179 [187 P. 425].)
[8} MtlFeOVer, ir~espec~
tive of spendthrift provisions. the tr~sts CQuld .not be so. termInated, since other persons. some perhaps not yet born,
}iad possible interests in the trust property. ((]ray v. Union
Trust 00., 171 Cal. 637 [154 P. 306]; Estalie of.Washburn"n
Cal.App. 735 [106 P. 415]; Woestman.v. Un20n Trust ek
Bank, 50 Cal. App. '604 [195 P. 944] ; Hunt, v.' La;wton,76 Cal.,
APP. 655 [245 P. 803]; Estate of Easterday,.45 Cal.App.2cl
f;98 [114 p,2d6e9].)
. In view of our decision that the gifts here .invo-Ived .were
iJlterided. to take effect in possession, or enjoyment at -death,
there is no need to consider the contention that they were.
made in'contemplation of the dono:f'sdeath..... .
The judgment is reversed.

all

Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tern., concurred..

466

ESTATE OF MADISON

[26 C.2d

SCHAUER, J.-I di~sent. trnder our -system of goveI'n.- '
ment wherein the basic power reposes in the people as diS~
tinguished from the state it is Il" fundamental principle that
"~ax procee<iings are in invitum, ,tax laws are strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the state . ~"
because presumptively the Legislature has: given in plain'
terms all the power intended to be exercised. A statute will
not beheld to have imposed a tax unless it is clear and explicit.;' (See 24 Cal.Jur. §11, pp. 27-28, and cases ther~
cited.) Here the involved statute provides that "A tax shall
be and is hereby impol'led upon the tralisfer of any property"
real or personal, or of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, to persons, institutions or corporations, ... said taxes to be upon the market value of such
property at the date of death of the decedent - [transieror],
. . . in the following cases: ... (3) When the transfer is of
property made by a resident . . . (a) In contemplation of
the death' of the grantor, ... or donor, or, (b) Intended 'to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after -f:luch death,
or in which a life income or interest is reserved 'by the grantor
either expressly or impliedly, or by the grantee promising to'
make payments to or care for the grantor . . . (d) By a
revocable trust created before or after the taking effect .of
this act~
"When such person, institution or corporation becomes
beneficially entit\ed' to possession or expectancy to any property or the income therefrom by any such transfer; whether
made before or·dter the passage of this act.
"In all tramferS inter vivos the value of the property
transferredsha.~l be taken as of the date of death' of the transferor and with the rates and exemptions then in effect.... "
(Italics added.. Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8495, § 2,
pp. 3955~395f}.)
The trialoourt fow:rd UpOI!. ample evidence that the transfers in quesiion were not made incontemp~ationof the death
'of the gran1mr. !tis also indisputable that the trusts created
'were and Bre ir.revocable, but the majority opinion, after a
discussinn of decisions of both the United States Supreme
Couri Bud the courts of other states, reaches the conclusion
that th~ California Legislature intended by its use of the
words "Intended to take eff;ectin possession. or enjoyment at
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or:'after, such death" to include as subject to an inheritance
'tax an ir.revocable transfer in trust of property, made several
years •prIor to the transferor's death and at' a time when he
was in··exctlllent health, 'even though by. such transfer the
transferor completely divested himself of all, ownership or
interest in' the property transferred and of all power to control,Its use or disposition.
The sole ground advanced or relied upon by such opinion
to justify imposition of the. tax is that the trusts were to, and
did, terminate at the end~OI a period of time measured by the
tr~tnsfer()I:'s ljfe; and the conclUsion is asserted in face of the
. fact that several years before the transferor's death the trans~
fershadl:)een· completed .and both enjoyment and possession
of the;Pi"operty had passedh'revocably from the transferor
tQ the Jointl,lnit of, trustee and beneficiary in each of the
respective trusts .
It apparently is not contended that if the duration of the
trusts had been measured -by any event other than the terminatiQn of the transferor's life the transfers would have been
subject to an inheritance tax upon the death of the transferor,
.and jtismy opinion that the mere fact that the d~ath of the
, transferor is selected as the event, upon which the legal title
to the corpora of the estates shall be conveyed by the trustees
.to ,the beneficiaries is not sufficient to justify us in holding
that as a matter of law the transferor intended the transfer
of the 'prope'rty "to take effect in po&session or enjoyment at
or after;' his death within the meaning of those words as employed by the Legislature in the Inheritance Tax Act. The
possession and enjoyment of the property, and its control,
passed completely from the transferor when he created the
trusts. Such possession, enjoyment, and control of the property, upon creation of the trusts, vested irrevocably in the
trustees and beneficiaries. The ~ffect of the majority opinion
is to impose a penalty upon the beneficiaries solely because
the transfers were made in trust for them instead of directly
to them. I am aware of no policy of the law which justifies
;such a holding.
. In Reineckev. Northern Trust Co. (1929),278 U.S. 339 [49
S.Ot. 123, 73 L.Ed. 410], the decedent, several years before
his death and at a time when there was no federal gift tax,
created five trusts with life estates in the incomes on terms not
'disclosed in the opinion. "In one the life interest was termi~
lJ.a~le five years after the death olthe settlor or on the death
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of the designated life heneficiary should she survive that date,
with a remainder' over. In the other fo.ur, life interests in the
inco.me were .created, terminahle five years· after the, settio.r's
death o.r o.n the death of the respective life tenants, whichever
sho.uld first happen, with remainders o.ver. The settlo.r reserved to. himself po.wer to. supervise the reinvestment o.f trust
funds, to. require the trustee to. execute pro.xies to. his no.minee,
to.vo.te any shares o.f sto.ck held hy the trustee, to. co.ntro.l all
leaves executed by the trustee, and to. appo.int successo.r
trustees. With respect to. each o.f these five trusts a po.wer
was also. reserved 'to. alter, change o.r mo.dify the trust,' which
was to. he exercised in the case o.f fo.ur o.f them hy the settlo.r
and the single heneficiary o.f each trust, acting jo.intly, and in
the case o.f o.ne of the trusts, hy the settlo.r and a majo.rity of
the beneficiaries named, acting jo.intly.
"The settlo.r died witho.ut having . . . mo.dified any o.f the
five trusts except o.ne, and that in a manner no.t no.w material." (278 U.S. at p. 344.) The federal estate statute impo.sed a tax "upo.n the transfer of the net estate of .every
decedent" and pro.vided that in calculating the tax there
sho.uld be included in the gro.ss estate all pro.perty, tangihle
and iIitangihle, "To. the extent o.f any interest therein o.f
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with
respect to. which he has at any tiIne created a trust; in co.ntemplatio.n o.f o.r intended to. take effect in po.ssession o.r enjo.yment
at o.r after his death."
The Supreme Co.urt, in ho.lding that the transfers were no.t
sUhject to. the federal estate tax, stated' «pp. 346-348. of 278
U.S.), "No.r did the reserved po.wers o.f management o.f the
trusts save to. decedent anyco.ntro.l o.ver the eco.no.mic benefits
or the enjo.yment o.f the pro.perty. He wo.uld equally have
reserved all these po.wers and o.thers had he -made himself the
trustee, but the transfer wo.uld no.t fo.r that reaso.n have been
inco.mplete. The shifting of the economic interest in-the tr'USt
property which was the subject of the tax was thus complete
as soon as the trust was ma(le. [Italics added.] His po.wer to.
recall the pro.perty and o.fco.ntro.l o.ver it fo.r his o.wn benefit
then ceased and as the trusts were not made in co.ntemplatio.n
of death, the reserved po.wers do. no.t serve to. distinguish them
fro.many o.ther gift inter vivos no.t subject to. the tax. . . '.
"In its pla~ and sco.pe the tax is o.ne impo.sedo.n transfers
at death o.r made in co.ntemplatio.n o.f death and is measured
hy the value at death Qf the interest which is transferred.
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• • . Itis no.t a gift tax. . . . One may freely give his prQPertytor"ano.ther hy abso.lute gift witho.ut suhjecting himself o.r
his estate to. a tax, hut we ,are asked to. say that this statute
means that he may n0t make a gift inter vivos, equally ahsQlute and co.mplete, witho.ut suhjecting it to. a tax if the gift
takes the fo.rm o.f a life estate in o.ne with remainder o.ver to
ano.ther at or after the do.no.r's death. It wo.uld require plain
and co.mpelling language to.. justify so. inco.ngrUQUS a result
and we think it is wanting in the present statute.... In the.
light o.f the general purpo.se Qf the statute and the language
of §401 explicitly impo.sing the tax o.n net estates o.f decedents~
'we think it. at least do.uhtful whether the trusts 0.1' interests
in a trust intended to. he reached hy the phrase in § 402 (c) "to
take effect in po.ssessio.n or enjo.yment at o.r after his death,'
in~lude any otherR than 'tho.se , passing, fro.m the possessio.n;
enJo.yment o.r co.ntro.l o.f the do.nor at his death and so. taxahle
as transfers at death under § 401. That do.uht must' he re:
so.lved in favo.r o.f the taxpayer."
,
It is argued in the majo.rity o.pinio.n that the Reinecke case
has been weakened by suhsequent decisio.ns o.f the Supreme
Co.urt. Suffice it to. po.int o.ut that such case has no.t heen o.verruled, that its so.und lo.gic remains unimpaired, and that the
facts and circumstances o.f the litigation no.w hefo.re us present
a manifestly stronger case fo.r the taxpayer than did tho.se o.f
the Reinecke case. Here the transfero.r reserved no. co.ntro.l
. o.ver the pro.perty co.nveyed and all of it vested immediately
. in full po.ssessio.n and enjo.yment in the respective units o.f
~rustees and beneficiaries. Furthermo.re, o.ur statute undertakes to. specifically enumerate the "cases" in which the tax
shall be o.perative and in such enumeratio.n lists a transfer
"By a revocable trust created hefo.re o.r after the taking effect
o.f this act." (Italics added.) This statute is creative and in
such a case it is a well established rule o.f co.nstructio.n that
the enumeratio.n o.f certain powers o.r items is exclusive o.f all
o.thers. (23 Cal.Jur. § 118, p. 740; 2 Sutherland, Statuto.rY
Co.nstructio.n (Ho.rack's ed. 1943) § 4915, p. 414; People v.
McCreery (1868),34 Cal. 432, 442; San Joaquin etc. lrri. Co.
v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [128 P. 924]; Pasadena
Uniper:sity v. Los Angeles County (1923), 190 Cal. 786, 790
[214P: 86~]; Gruben v. Leeb1'ick & Fisher, Inc. (1938), 32
Cal.App.2dSupp. 762, 765 [84 P.2d 1078]; see, also., Johnston
v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264~265 [139 P. 86]; Moore v.
WebiJ-'(J:93B), 219 Ca1.·304, 309 [26P.2d 22, 89 A,L.R. 9251;
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I'll, re Peart (1935), 5CaLApp.2d 469, 472 [43P.2d 334].)
There is no sound basit;; for assuming that the I,egislature
~ou.ld have specifically designated a "revocable .trust" as
beiIlg subject to the tax, without any mention of irrevocable
trusts, if it had intended also to tax the latter.
It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in May .v. Heiner
(1930), 281 U.S. 238, 244 [50 S.Ot. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67
A.L.R. 1244], followed the Reinecke case and that Helvering
v. Hallock (1940), 309 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ot. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604,
125 A.L.R. 1368], does not purport to overrule it. In fact the
author of the opinion in the Helvering case expressly states
(p. 110 of 309 U.S.) that "Whether the transfer made by the
decedent in his lifetime is 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyrrient at or after his death' by reason of that
which he retained, is the crux of the problem." (Italics
added.) As previously observed, in the case now before us,
the grantor retained nothing. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
00. v. Rothensies (1945), - - U.S. [65 S.Ot. 508, 89
L. Ed. --], the Supreme Court again had a tax question
before it but again did not depart from the Reinecke ho~ding.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a (loncurring opinion, specifically
pointed out that "The District Court found that this trust
was 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after' the death of the decedent. The Circuit Court of Ap~
peals agreed. Certiorari was not granted on that question but
only on the question whether the entire value of the corpus
of the trust at the time of decedent's death shou.ld be included
in her gross estate." The trust involved was one in which the
grantor reserved/or herselfduril1g her life the income of the
trust.
Subsequent to the execution of the trust grants here in,
volved the people of this state enacted the Gift Tax Act of
1939. Such act provides a tax upon the transfer of property
as an inter vivos gift and specifically provides that the word
"transfer," as used therein, "includes the passing of property
or any interest therein, in possession or enjoyment, present .or
future, by. gift, or· any transfer made with donat~ve' mten~~'
(Gift Tax. Act of 1939, Deering's Gen. Laws, AC,lt. 8490c,§ 4).
and that "The tax applies whether thet.ranl;1fer is ill ·trust
otherwise, whether the gift is direct. or. ~n~j:reci;~ . .'? (Id.,
§ lH). It seems to me that common honesty ana.. fairness to the
taxpayer, let alone that plane of integrity. :~r}lich is due from
the state in its dealings with its citizens~ dernanq t;hatwea~.

or

~;""~'~_"

...

'

" .. ,

'

".,,)

,>,

~\

~

¢"

.l

BSTATE OF MAmSON
[26 C.2d 453; 159.P.2d 630]

•

471

praise the transactions now before us as being either inter
vivos gifts or as transfers in contemplation of, or to take effect
upon, death. We cannot fairly classify such transactions as
having two inconsistent characters. It would be sharp dealing,
unworthy of a democracy to look back upon a transaction
preceding. the Gift Tax Act, which transaction clearly
amounted toa gift inter vivos and not to a transfer in contemplation of death or to take effect only upon death and to
classify it as subject to inheritance tax purely for th~ sake of
gathering income to the state.
The Inheritance Tax Act has not been materially amended
in its pertinent application to this case since the creation of
the trusts in controversy. If those trusts, created in 1935, are
properly subject to inheritance tax; then the same trusts, if
created now, would be subject to such tax. Surely my brethren
of the majority opinion would not go so far as to hold that
the transfers of 1935 were "in contemplation of the death"
of the grantor or to "take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after such death" within the meaning of the Inheritance
Tax Act and at the same time classify them as transfers inter
vivos so as to subject them to the gift tax. Manifestly if the
property interests did not pass until death of the grantor then
the transfers are subject to inheritance tax but equally mani·fest is it that if such property interests in their full value
were transferreet· when the trust grants were. executed then
such transfers would be, if made after enactment of the Gift
Tax Act, subject to the gift tax. 'rhe mere fact·that they were
made prior to the enactment of the Gift Tax Act of 1939
cannot operate to bring them within the otherwise inapplicable
Inheritance Tax Act. Certainly, unless we are prepared to
hold that the transfers now before us, if they were to take
place subsequent to the enactment of the Gift Tax Act, would
nevertheless be subject to the Inheritance Tax Act and not to
the Gift Tax Act, we shou.ld not hold that they are subject to
such, Inheritance Tax Act merely because they originated
prior to the enactment of the Gift Tax Act.
Lastly, it must be noted that the trial court found as a fact,
upon conflicting inferences, in substance that the transfers
. in question were intended to, and did, take effect immediately
upon the execution of the trust grants and that they were
not "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment [only]
,at or after such [the grantor's] death." The majority opinion
lists a number of facts and circumstances in evidence which
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it argues support the inference that the transfers were intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
grantor's death. But the drawing of such inferences and the
effect to be given them were matters properly for thedeter~
mination of the trial court. The rule is that an "appellate
court will accept or adhere to the interpretation [of a document] adopted by the trial court-arid not substitute another
of its own- . . . where parol evidence was introduced in
aid of its interpretation, and such evidence ... is such that
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom." (4 Cal.Jur.
IO-Yr.Supp; 1943 rev. § 192, pp. 146-147; see, also, 2 Cal.
Jur, § 549, pp. 934~935.)
.
.
Unless we are to depart from long establishel law;including the basic principle that the people are. to be seryeq before
the state, the judgment should be affirmed.
Shenk, J., concurred.

[S.F. No. 17000. In Bank. May 31, 1945.]

Estate of ANDREW LUND, Deceased. BERT A. LUND,
Appellarlt, V'. FRANK LUND, Individually and as
Guardian, etc., Respondent.
Con:ll.i~ of Laws - Property- Succession.-Whether a 6b.ild
shall succeed to the estate of his father is determined in ..the
case of land by the law of the situs of the land, and in the case
of movables by the'law of the domicile of the father at the time
of his death unless the law of the situs of the property provides that the law of decedent's domicile shall not govern.
.
(Civ. Code, §§ 755, 946.)
[2] Statutes-Acts of Other States.-:-Where a statute of another
state is consistently referred to by the courts thereof as .a
statute of descent rather than one regulating status, such
references tend to show an interpretation of the statute by the

[1]

[1] Law of situs of property as determining legitimacy, ~oie,
73 A.L.R. 942.
'.'McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Confiillt of Laws,§ 20; [2] Statutes, § 121; [4, 6] Illegitimacy, § 27; [5, 12] Adoption, §'43; [7,:' tJ]
Illegitimacy, § 18; [8]Confiict of Laws, §3; [101 Illegititrui1r,
,§18.i [11, 13-15] Adoption, § 42; I16]Adoptio~ § 48•......' .';",i

~.," ;." courts of'the stite itt: which it is enacted, and such interpretation should be respected by a California court.
fSa, &b]Confiict of Laws-Property - Succession.-The .right of
. an illegitimate child born in a foreign country to inherit from
his father, who publicly acknowledged the child as his son
whl.le residing in other states, and who died while residing in
California, leaving estate herein, depends exchlsively on California law and such right, if existent, derives necessarily from
our statute of legitimation.
[4] Illegitimacy - Rights Acquired by Illegitimates-Inheritance.
--At ,common la'Y an illegitimateehild could not inherit from
h~s natural father. The. public policy of California, however,
dlsavows the commonclaw tenets and .favors legitimation.
[5] Adoption--:By Legitimation.-Civ. Code, § 230, relating to the
adoption of an illegitimate child, is on its face primarily a
law governing legitimation or status.
'
[6] Illegitimacy~Rights Acquired' by Illegitimates-Statutes Governi~g.- W,hi,le a statute of' succession under which an illegitimate child;'can. at least to a limited extent, ,inherit as if he
were legitimate, is merely .a law of devolution 'Of property,
a statute of legitimacy is, in effect, all of that and more, and
the attainm.ent of the full and unqualified status of legitimacy
carrie~ with it as an incident thereof the right to inherit.
t7] Id.-Legitimation---:Statutes Governing.-The subject of legiti,.
mation, as well as that of succession to property,. is a proper
.' one for. state legislation; and such statutes, being remedial,
may even be applied retrospectively.
.
[8] Confiictof loaws-Laws Governing Status-Legitimacy.-The
question as to. which state shall furnish the law to determine
the legitimacy of a child is one of comity and is not controlled
py the. (lonstitutional provision as to "ful} faith and credit."
If a state is not bound to rec(jgnize a status of legitimacy created in another state it is not obligated to leave unchanged
a status of illegitimacy existing in such other state.
[9] Illegitimacy-Legitimation-Power of State.-Each state may
formulate its own public' policy in respect to legitimation and
can enact laws to carry out its policy~ There is no' coiIstitutional proscription against a state's adopting legislation which
makes legitimate within the operation of its laws .children
who. ar.e illegitimate in other jurisdictions, nor is there' any
• eonstitutional requirement that such laws be limited in their
'applicability tpchildreiI who)were born in the state or whose
parents were domiciled in the state at the time of their birth

